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arrest." S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 6-7. 
The Court found that the already com-
pelling interest in preventing crime is 
heightened when the government has con-
vincing proof that the arrestee presents a 
demonstrable danger to the community. 
"Under these narrow circumstances, socie-
ty's interest in crime prevention is at its 
greatest." United States v. Salerno, 107 
S.Ct. 2095 at 2103. 
When the government proves by clear 
and convincing evidence that an 
arrestee presents an identified and arti-
culable threat to an individual or the 
community, we believe that, consis-
tent with the Due Process Clause, a 
court may disable the arrestee from 
executing that threat. Under these cir-
cumstances, we cannot categorically 
state that pretrial detention "offends 
some principle of justice so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97, 105 (1934). 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2103. 
The Court thus concluded there was no 
facial violation of substantive due process. 
Turning to the facial challenge against 
the procedures, the Court stated that "[t]o 
sustain [the procedures] against such a 
challenge, we need only find them "ade-
quate to authorize the pretrial detention of 
at least some persons charged with 
crimes." Id. at 2103, quoting Schall v. Afar· 
tin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). The Court then 
went on to detail the procedures called for 
under the Act. 
Detainees have the right to counsel, to 
testify, present information by proffer or 
otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses. 
The government has the burden and must 
prove its case by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Section 3142(F); and the judge must 
include written findings. §3142(i). There is 
also immediate appellate review. §3245(c). 
The Court concluded that the extensive 
safeguards were sufficient to repel a facial 
challenge against the procedures. 
The Court turned finally to respon-
dent's challenge based on the excessive bail 
clause of the eighth amendment. The 
Court stated that the U[p ]rimary function 
of bail is to safeguard the Courts' role in 
adjudicating the guilt or innocence of 
defendants .... " United States v. Salerno, 
107 S.Ct. at 2104. However, the Court 
refused to interpret the bail clause in such 
a fashion as to make bail available in all cir-
cumstances. 
The Court stated that, "[Tlhe Eighth 
Amendment does not prevent Congress 
from defining the classes of cases in which 
bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus, 
in criminal cases bail is not compulsory 
where the punishment may be death. 
Indeed, the very language of the Amend-
ment fails to say all arrests must be 
bailable." United States v. Salerno, 107 
S.Ct. at 2105, quoting Carlson v. Landon, 
342 U.S. 524, 545-546 (1952). 
Thus, the Court expressly empowered 
Congress to impose other considerations 
other than questions of flight when deci-
ding whether to allow an arrestee out on 
bail. 
We believe that when Congress has 
mandated detention on the basis of a 
compelling interest other than preven-
tion of flight, as it has here, the Eighth 
Amendment does not require release 
on bail. 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2105. 
In sum, the Supreme Court has found 
that Congress may constitutionally 
impose considerations other than flight to 
the decision of whether an arrestee is bail 
eligible. Where the considerations are 
compelling, the Court will defer to the 
will of Congress. 
-Michael Scott Friedman 
Arizona v. Mauro: POllCE ACTIONS 
OF WI1NESSING AND 
RECORDING A PRE-DETENTION 
MEETING DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
AN INTERROGATION IN VIOLA-
TION OF MIRANDA 
In Arizona v. Mauro, - U.S. -, 107 
S.Ct. 1931 (1987), the United States 
Supreme Court held that an "interroga-
tion" did not result from police actions of 
recording and witnessing a predetention 
meeting between the accused and his 
spouse. In reversing a judgment of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court, the Court decided 
that Mauro's invocation of his Miranda 
rights did not extend any privilege of con-
fidentiality to remarks made to his wife in 
a "private" meeting arranged by police at 
the insistence of the defendant's spouse. 
After admitting to police that he had 
murdered his son, William Carl Mauro 
was arrested and advised of his constitu-
tional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Mauro was twice read 
his right to refuse to make any statement 
without an attorney present. At Mauro's 
request, police interrogation immediately 
halted. 
Meanwhile in another room at the police 
station, Mrs. Mauro was also being ques-
tioned concerning the murder of her child. 
After questioning, she became adamant in 
her demand to meet with her husband. 
Although reluctant at first, the police con-
sented to the meeting only on the condi-
tion that an officer be present. The Mauros 
were not consulted prior to their meeting, 
and their brief conversation was recorded 
by a tape recorder within their plain view. 
During the meeting, Mrs. Mauro expressed 
despair, while Mr. Mauro advised her not 
to answer any questions until an attorney 
was present. Mauro, 107 S.Ct. at 1933. 
At trial, the defense put forth an insanity 
plea which the prosecution rebutted by 
playing back the recorded conversation, 
and arguing that the recording showed 
Mauro was sane on the day of the murder. 
The trial court refused Mauro's motion to 
suppress the recording, rejecting the 
defense that it was a product of police 
interrogation in violation of his Miranda 
rights. Mauro was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to death, and the present 
appeal ensued. 
In reversing the trial court decision, the 
Arizona Supreme Court found that the 
police had interrogated Mauro under 
Miranda by allowing him to speak to his 
wife in the presence of an officer. Arizona 
'0. Mauro, 149 Ariz. 24, 716 P.2d 393 
(1986). According to the court, the inter-
rogation was invalid because Mauro had 
requested counsel before any further ques-
tioning. The court based its holding on 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), 
which held that interrogation may include 
practices "that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect." Id. at 30t. 
Since two police officers had testified dur-
ing pretrial hearings that they thought it 
possible that Mauro might make 
incriminating remarks during the meeting 
with his spouse, the court found that Innis 
applied, and overturned the trial court's 
admission of the recorded conversation 
into evidence. 
The Supreme Court reversed, by a 5 to 
4 margin. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Powell focused on the issue of whether the 
police actions were the "functional equiva-
lent" of interrogation under Innis. In hold-
ing that no interrogation occurred, the 
Court found that the officer present at the 
meeting between the Mauros posed no 
questions to the defendant. This had the 
effect of rejecting the minority view, 
embraced by Justice Stevens, that the 
police "employed a powerful psychologi-
cal ploy" against Mauro. Mauro, 107 S.Ct. 
at 1937. Justice Stevens, for the dissent, 
argued that the police actions over-
whelmed Mauro because they did not pro-
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vide him with an opportunity to refuse to 
speak with his wife, or tell him in advance 
that police officer would be present and 
the conversation recorded. The majority 
found no evidence to suggest that the 
police had acted to allow the meeting "for 
the purpose of eliciting incriminating 
statements," Id. at 1936, and upheld the 
trial judge's decision to admit the taped 
conversation. Indeed, the Court found the 
officers acted to discourage the meeting 
entirely, and only stipulated to having an 
-officer present to ensure the safety of Mrs. 
Mauro.Id. 
The opinion espoused by the Court in 
Mauro narrows the interpretation of Innis 
with respect to action by the police in lieu 
of direct interrogation of suspects. The 
Court now permits the police to obtain by 
proxy that which they can not obtain 
directly, voluntary self-incriminating state-
ments made in the course of a pre-
detention meeting between an accused and ' 
a spouse. Such statements may now be 
used against a defendant at trial~ despite 
police orchestration of and participation in 
any such meeting, and notwithstanding 
the defendant's prior assertion of his 
Miranda rights under the fifth amendment. 
- Mark Brugh 
Maryland v. Garrison: GOOD-FAITH 
MISTAKE IN VALID BUT 
OVERBROAD SEARCH WARRANT 
DOES NOT INVAUDATE SEARCH 
As a result of the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Maryland 'D. Garrison, 
U.S. 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987), the Rehnquist 
Court has carved, yet, another good-faith 
exception to the warrant requirement. In 
Garrison, the Court held that' a factual mis-
take made in good-faith by police officers 
did not invalidate a broader than appro-
priate Search warrant or its accompanying 
search. The search, the Court explained, 
was only limited by the police officers' dis-
covery of their factual mistake. 
In Garrison, "Baltimore police officers 
obtained and executed a warrant to search 
the person of Lawrence McWebb and the 
premises known as 2036 Park Avenue 
third floor apartment." Id. at 1014. The 
search was for controlled substances and 
related paraphernalia. 
At the time the police obtained the war-
rant and began their search they were of 
the belief that only one apartment existed 
on the third floor of 2036 Park Avenue. 
Information was obtained from an infor-
mant that McWebb was selling marijuana 
from this third floor apartment. A tele-
phone call to the Baltimore Gas and Elec-
tric Company confirmed that there was 
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one apartment situated on the third floor, 
thereby corroborating the police officers' 
belief. Although the police inspected the 
outside of the seven unit building, the 
building was not approached until the war-
rant was executed. The third floor, which 
had a common doorway and vestibule, was 
divided into two separate units - one 
belonging to McWebb and the other to 
respondent, Garrison. Before the police 
officers became aware of their mistake, 
they searched' Garrison's apartment and 
seized contraband in violation of 
Maryland's Controlled Substances Act. 
Md. Ann. Code art. 27 §276 (1957). 
A Maryland trial court denied Garri-
son's motion to suppress the evidence seiz-
ed from his apartment. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. Id. 
58 Md. App. 417, 473, A.2d 514 (1984). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland revers-
ed. 303 Md. 385, 494 A.2d 193 (1985). 
In a 6-3 decision, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, divided the case 
into two constitutional issues. The first 
considered the validity of the warrant and 
the second, the reasonableness of the way 
the police officers executed the warrant. 
As to the validity of the warrant, "[t]he 
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment categorically prohibits the issuance 
of any warrant except one particularly 
describing the place to be search and the 
person's or things to be seized." Id. at 
1017. Because Garrison made no claim that 
the warrant did not adequately describe 
"the persons or things to be seized" or 
that there was no probable cause to believe 
that they might be in "the place to be sear-
ched" as specified in the warrant, the 
Court held that this Fourth Amendment 
particularity-of-description requirement 
was met. The issue, Stevens said, becomes 
"whether that factual mistake (i.e., believ-
ing only McWebb's apartment existed on 
the third floor) iqvalidated a warrant that 
undoubtedly would have been valid if it 
had reflected a completely accurate 
understanding of the building's floor 
plan." Id. 
This issue, Stevens continued, turns on 
the constitutionality of the police officers' 
"conduct in light of the information 
available to them at the time they acted." 
Id. The majority found that the police offi-
cers reasonable believed, based on the 
information they had gathered, that only 
McWebb's apartment occupied the third 
floor. Thus, the Court concluded, "the 
warrant, insofar as it authorized a search 
that turned out ambiguous in scope, was 
valid when it issued." Id. at 1018. 
Next, the Court addressed the 
reasonableness of the way in which the 
police officers executed the warrant. The 
majority stated that the police had gained 
access to the third floor common area 
legally; "they carried a search warrant and 
they were accompanied by McWebb who 
provided the key to the third floor." Id. at 
1018. Thus, the Court only considered the 
police officers' conduct in executing the 
warrant once they entered the third floor 
common area. 
The majority stated that the police offi-
cers were required to discontinue the sear-
ch of Garrison's apartment once they 
discovered or should have discovered that 
the third floor contained two apartments 
instead of the assumed one. However, "the 
Court has also recognized the need to 
allow some latitude for honest mistakes 
that are made by officers in the dangerous 
and difficult process of making arrests and 
executing search warrants." Id. at 1018. 
Citing HiD 'D. California, 401 U.s. 797 
(1971), for the proposition that honest mis-
takes in arrests obviate' Fourth Amend-
ment concerns, the majority held that "the 
officers' conduct was consistent with a 
reasonable effort to ascertain and identify 
the place intended to be searched within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 
Id. at 1019. Before their discovery of the 
factual mistake, the majority stated the 
officers understandably and reasonably 
believed that "McWebb's apartment and 
the third-floor premises as one and the 
same." Id. 'The execution of the warrant, 
the majority held, reasonably included the 
entire third floor and consequently, the 
contraband found on that floor was prop-
erly admissible. 
Justice Blackmun, along the Justices 
Brennan and Marshall dissented. A person, 
Blackmun opined, has the highest expecta-
tion of privacy in his home, whether it be 
a mobile home, a unit in a multiple-
occupancy dwelling, or the most majestic 
mansion. Indeed, "the physical entry of 
the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed." Id. at 1020. (Blackmum, J. dis-
senting) Therefore, absent one of the war-
rant requirement exceptions as stated in 
Coolidge 'D. New Hampshsire, 403 U.S. 443, 
478 (1971), a warrantless search of a home 
is presumptively unreasonable. 
In concluding, that the search of Garri-
son's apartment was warrantless and there-
fore improper, the dissent did not believe 
the particularity-of-description require-
ment of the search warrant was met. This 
particularity requirement applies with 
equal force to multi-unit buildings as to 
individual private homes, requiring that 
the targeted unit be described with enough 
specificity to prevent a search of all units. 
Garrison at 107 S.Ct. 1021. When applying 
